Parrhesia first appeared in Greek literature in the fifth century BC. Essentially, parrhesia refers to being granted the liberty to speak freely and openly without being deemed insubordinate to someone of greater authority and could otherwise lead to punishment or death. Parrhesia allows one to speak truth to power, essentially benefiting the one in power who lacks insight into the truth of a situation. In his book, Filosoferen met kinderen op de basisschool: een complexe activiteit, Berrie Heesen describes how doing (...) philosophy with children is a form of parrhesia in that it encourages children to speak freely and openly. Parrhesia changes the adult/child relationship. Taken seriously by adults as full-fledged human beings creates a space for children to take themselves seriously while also being held responsible for what they think and feel. By giving reasons for their thoughts and feelings, and listening to those of their peers, children not only become critical listeners of others but also of themselves. They learn that what they think and feel matters — that they matter in the eyes of others and themselves, raising their self-esteem as well. In the process, children also develop their own touchstones of reality. Moreover, (self-) scrutiny is essential to feeling whole and grounded in who we are, giving us a sense of purpose and direction. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo abordamos actuaciones administrativas enmarcadas en la Dirección de Espectáculos Públicos (DEP) de la Municipalidad de Córdoba. Particularmente, nos preguntamos por los sujetos encargados de implementar las políticas de esta dirección (inspectores) y la formación que adquieren para el ejercicio de prácticas administrativas de control y fiscalización de “casas de fiestas infantiles” y locales de diversión nocturna (bares, discotecas, bailes). Las preguntas que guían el análisis son las siguientes: ¿Cómo se adquieren los conocimientos necesarios para “ser inspector (...) municipal” y cuáles son los escenarios y modalidades de transmisión? ¿Cuáles son los saberes que circulan, se movilizan y son (re)apropiados en esos espacios? Y, finalmente, ¿qué sujetos se construyen en estos procesos (“inspectores”, “especialistas”, “capacitadores”)? Como fuente de reflexión empírica, consideramos actuaciones administrativas que tienen lugar en la DEP, junto con los cursos de capacitación en “Inspectoría General” ofrecidos a los agentes municipales que se desempeñan en aquella Dirección. Los materiales utilizados en el análisis provienen de registros de observaciones participantes realizadas en la DEP, en un curso de capacitación, y entrevistas a funcionarios e inspectores municipales. Las argumentaciones vertidas a lo largo del artículo pretenden contribuir al estudio de los procesos de formación continua del Estado municipal cordobés, a partir de una indagación etnográfica en torno a actuaciones administrativas y formas de transmisión de conocimientos para determinados ejercicios de poder estatal. (shrink)

Este texto recoge una visión particular de la Filosofía del Derecho, en tanto situada y posicionada. Lo primero porque parte de la experiencia y la subjetividadde quien le da voz. Lo segundo porque en el texto se defiende una concepción instrumentalista del Derecho con fines contra-hegemónicos. Paraestructurar la exposición de esta particular visión iusfilosófica se utiliza la distinción entre la Filosofía como teoría y como práctica. En el apartado relativoa la Filosofía como teoría se analizan diversas posturas sobre la relación (...) entre el Derecho y el Poder. En el apartado de la Filosofía como práctica seincluye la labor de la Clínica Jurídica por la Justicia Social de la UPV/EHU en el diseño de estrategias antisubordiscriminatorias. (shrink)

info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion.

Nel 1488 Laura Cereta compone una lettera indirizzata a Bibulus Sempronius, al quale scrive una risposta indignata. Secondo Cereta, quest’uomo debole, spudorato e fuorviato non è in grado di riconoscere le virtù femminili; in più non è a conoscenza di importanti figure femminili prosperate in passato e non si mostra il doveroso rispetto nei confronti delle donne intellettuali. Per questi motivi, viene esaminata la difesa da parte dell’autrice delle capacità intellettuali diachroniche delle donne, nonché la contestualizzazione della comprensione e dell’integrazione (...) dei valori umanistici nella sua opera. Inoltre, Cereta sottolinea la necessità dell’educazione femminile e il diritto delle donne ad essere riconosciute intellettualmente uguali accanto agli uomini illustri. (shrink)

Recent authors have drawn attention to a new kind of defeating evidence commonly referred to as higher-order evidence. Such evidence works by inducing doubts that one’s doxastic state is the result of a flawed process – for instance, a process brought about by a reason-distorting drug. I argue that accommodating defeat by higher-order evidence requires a two-tiered theory of justification, and that the phenomenon gives rise to a puzzle. The puzzle is that at least in some situations involving higher-order defeaters (...) the correct epistemic rules issue conflicting recommendations. For instance, a subject ought to believe p, but she ought also to suspend judgment in p. I discuss three responses. The first resists the puzzle by arguing that there is only one correct epistemic rule, an Über-rule. The second accepts that there are genuine epistemic dilemmas. The third appeals to a hierarchy or ordering of correct epistemic rules. I spell out problems for all of these responses. I conclude that the right lesson to draw from the puzzle is that a state can be epistemically rational or justified even if one has what looks to be strong evidence to think that it is not. As such, the considerations put forth constitute a non question-begging argument for a kind of externalism. (shrink)

I formulate a resilient paradox about epistemic rationality, discuss and reject various solutions, and sketch a way out. The paradox exemplifies a tension between a wide range of views of epistemic justification, on the one hand, and enkratic requirements on rationality, on the other. According to the enkratic requirements, certain mismatched doxastic states are irrational, such as believing p, while believing that it is irrational for one to believe p. I focus on an evidentialist view of justification on which a (...) doxastic state regarding a proposition p is epistemically rational or justified just in case it tracks the degree to which one’s evidence supports p. If it is possible to have certain kinds of misleading evidence, then evidentialism and the enkratic requirements come into conflict. Yet, both have been defended as platitudinous. After discussing and rejecting three solutions, I sketch an account that rejects the enkratic requirements, while nevertheless explaining our sense that epistemic akrasia is a distinct kind of epistemic failure. Central to the account is distinguishing between two evaluative perspectives, one having to do with the relevant kind of success, the other having to do with manifesting good dispositions. The problem with akratic subjects, I argue, is that they manifest dispositions to fail to correctly respond to a special class of conclusive and conspicuous reasons. (shrink)

La autora nos ubica en las discusiones más recientes de la filosofía política y de la ética. Su objetivo es plantear la posibilidad de encontrar una interrelación entre ambas sin que ello suponga un retorno a las ideas aristotélicas.

: The key concept is "vertigo of secularization." It relates to the fears that societies experience when understanding the need to ground their political orders as separated from religion. The erosion of values produces vertigos around the world. We need to understand better these kinds of processes because only by doing so can we keep that fear and violence from taking precedence over the hard working tasks of building up a global political community.

El presente ensayo se articula en tres partes o momentos: primero, los fundamentos de una reflexión sobre el tema, afines pero no siempre coincidentes con el pensamiento de Bachelard. En segundo lugar, se presenta un diálogo con la poética de los elementos de Bachelard; en tercer lugar, se plantean las conclusiones acerca de estas reflexiones.

Subjects who retain their beliefs in the face of higher-order evidence that those very beliefs are outputs of flawed cognitive processes are at least very often criticisable. Many think that this is because such higher-order evidence defeats various epistemic statuses such as justification and knowledge, but it is notoriously difficult to give an account of such defeat. This paper outlines an alternative explanation, stemming from some of my earlier work, for why subjects are criticisable for retaining beliefs in the face (...) of paradigm kinds of putatively defeating higher-order evidence: they manifest dispositions that are bad relative to a range of candidate epistemic successes such as true belief and knowledge. In particular, giving up belief in response to higher-order evidence only when that evidence is not misleading would require subjects to have dispositions that discriminate between cases in which their original cognitive processes is fine, and cases in which they merely seemed to be fine. But, I argue, such dispositions are not normally humanly feasible. I show that retaining belief in putative cases of defeat by higher-order evidence is problematic irrespective of whether veritism or some form of gnosticism is true. In the end I contrast my account of dispositional evaluations with similar-sounding ideas that have been put forth in the literature, such as consequentialist views that focus on instrumental means to success. (shrink)

What sort of doxastic response is rational to learning that one disagrees with an epistemic peer who has evaluated the same evidence? I argue that even weak general recommendations run the risk of being incompatible with a pair of real epistemic phenomena, what I call evidential attenuation and evidential amplification. I focus on a popular and intuitive view of disagreement, the equal weight view. I take it to state that in cases of peer disagreement, a subject ought to end up (...) equally confident that her own opinion is correct as that the opinion of her peer is. I say why we should regard the equal weight view as a synchronic constraint on (prior) credence functions. I then spell out a trilemma for the view: it violates what are intuitively correct updates (also leading to violations of conditionalisation), it poses implausible restrictions on prior credence functions, or it is non-substantive. The sorts of reasons why the equal weight view fails apply to other views as well: there is no blanket answer to the question of how a subject should adjust her opinions in cases of peer disagreement. (shrink)

Being incoherent is often viewed as a paradigm kind of irrationality. Numerous authors attempt to explain the distinct-seeming failure of incoherence by positing a set of requirements of structural rationality. I argue that the notion of coherence that structural requirements are meant to capture is very slippery, and that intuitive judgments – in particular, a charge of a distinct, blatant kind of irrationality – are very imperfectly correlated with respecting the canon of structural requirements. I outline an alternative strategy for (...) explaining our patterns of normative disapproval, one appealing to feasible dispositions to conform to substantive, non-structural norms. A wide range of paradigmatic cases of incoherence, I will argue, involve manifesting problematic dispositions, dispositions that manifest across a range of cases as blatant-seeming normative failures. (shrink)

Siegfried Kracauer was a leading figure on the Weimar arts scene and one of the foremost representatives of the Frankfurt School of critical theory. Best known for a wealth of writings on sociology and film theory, his influence is felt in the work of many of the period’s preeminent thinkers, including the critic Theodor W. Adorno, who once claimed he owed more to Kracauer than any other intellectual. Kracauer.Photographic Archive, a companion volume to The Past’s Threshold: Essays on Photography, collects (...) previously unpublished photographs by Siegfried and Elisabeth, “Lili,” Kracauer. With its remarkably rich material, the book tells the story of the Kracauer’s close working relationship, from their marriage in Germany to their escape to Paris and the war and postwar years in the United States. While neither Kracauer nor his wife trained in photography, their portraits, city views, and landscapes evince impressive aesthetic and technical skill, while simultaneously shedding light on their lives marked by exile and flight. (shrink)

Xavier Zubiri y Leonardo Polo son partidarios del realismo gnoseológico. Ambos reflexionan sobre lo que es propio del acto cognoscitivo, en cuanto acto cognoscitivo. Zubiri afirma que conocer es actualización de realidad, pues en el conocer está presente la actualidad de la realidad, no de modo intencional, está como realidad en su estricto de suyo. La superación del objeto se da por la riqueza en que queda la realidad actualizada, en su contenido y su formalidad. Para Polo, lo propio del (...) acto cognoscitivo es ser operación, praxis perfecta o inmanente, co-actualidad de acto y objeto; pero la presencia propia del objeto manifiesta su límite desde el conocimiento habitual. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to argue for a position holding that epigenetic responsibility primarily should be a political and not an individual responsibility. Epigenetic is a rapidly growing research field studying regulations of gene expression that do not change the DNA sequence. Knowledge about these mechanisms is still uncertain in many respects, but main presumptions are that they are triggered by environmental factors and life style and, to a certain extent, heritable to subsequent generations, thereby reminding of aspects (...) of Lamarckism. Epigenetic research advances give rise to intriguing challenges for responsibility relations between the society and the individual. Responsibility is commonly understood in a backwards-looking manner, identifying causally responsible actors to blame for a bad outcome. If only a backwards-looking responsibility model is applied, epigenetics might give rise to arduous responsibility ascriptions to individuals for their health and the health of their future descendants. This would put heavy responsibility burdens on actors constrained by unequal social and economic structures. In contrast, a forward-looking responsibility notion takes account of structural conditions and pay attention to who is best placed to do something about conditions contributing to bad outcomes. A forward-looking responsibility notion would partly free disadvantaged individuals from responsibility, and identify actors with power and capacity to do something about structural factors constraining genuine choice. (shrink)

Previous research indicates positive effects of a person’s attractiveness on evaluations of opposite-sex persons, but less positive or even negative effects of attractiveness on same-sex evaluations. These biases are consistent with social motives linked to mate search and intrasexual rivalry. In line with the hypothesis that such motives should not become operative until after puberty, 6- to 12-year-old participants (i.e., children) displayed no evidence for biased social evaluations based on other people’s attractiveness. In contrast, 13- to 19-year-old participants (i.e., adolescents) (...) displayed positive and negative attractiveness biases toward opposite- and same-sex targets, respectively. Moreover, these biases increased with the age—and thus the reproductive relevance—of the targets being evaluated. Findings corroborate the relevance of mating-related motives for social judgment and illustrate how such biases can grow during human development. At a broader conceptual level, this research demonstrates the utility of investigating proximate social judgment processes through the lens of adaptationist thinking. (shrink)

A Philosophy to Live By highlights Murdoch's distinctive conception of philosophy as a spiritual or existential practice and enlists the resources of her thought to explore a wide range of thinkers and debates at the intersections of moral philosophy, religion, art, and politics.

QUESTIONS DE METHODE I. Au contraire de Sartre qui, a partir de quelques elements cueillis dans les ecrits de HusserI concernant la conscience ima geante, a bllti sa propre doctrine de!'imagination, nous nous proposons de reconstituer, a partir de ces m~mes elements, ce qu'on pourrait appeler la theort:e husserlienne de l'imagination, c'est-a-dire la theorie que HusserI eut lui-m~me construite, s'il avait reuni en une synthese les elements qu'il a laisses epars. Une entreprise de ce genre est toujours delicate et souleve (...) des prob!emes difficiles - a commencer par celui de sa legitimite. N ous ecartons d'emblee l'objection d'ordre general qui contesterait Ie droit de systematiser dans l'reuvre d'un auteur ce que lui-m~me a laisse disperse et eventuellement inacheve. Par un tel scrupule, on sacrifie sans doute a la rigueur historique mais on est beaucoup moins soucieux de penetrer une pensee dans son dynamisme in terne et profond et, en derniere analyse, on protege les droits de l'archeologie mais non pas ceux de la culture et de son progreso Nous pensons a une difficulte beaucoup plus serieuse; de sa so lution depend l'attitude a adopter en face des textes dont nous devons nous servir dans notre etude. Nous utilisons des ouvrages qui couvrent la totalite de la car riere philosophique de HusserIl. (shrink)

Most scholars of emotions concede that although cognitive evaluations are essential for emotion, they are not sufficient for it, and that other elements, such as bodily feelings, physiological sensations and behavioral expressions are also required. However, only a few discuss how these diverse aspects of emotion are related in order to form the unity of emotion. In this essay I examine the co-presence and the causal views, and I argue that neither view can account for the unity of emotions. In (...) particular, both views face the problem of fortuitous connection, and, as a result, they fail to identify and distinguish an emotion from other mental states. Consequently, they fail to account for our first person authority over our emotions. I finally argue that only an internal, conceptual relation between the cognitive/evaluative and affective/physiological aspects of emotion can avoid such problems, and suggest that the Aristotelian distinction of form and matter can provide such internal relation. (shrink)

Certain emotional processes “bypass the will” and even awareness, whereas others arise due to the deliberative evaluation of objects, states, and events. It is important to differentiate between the automatic versus reflective origins of emotional processes, and sensory versus conceptual bases of diverse negative and positive emotions. A taxonomy of emotions based on different origins is presented. This taxonomy distinguishes between negative and positive automatic versus reflective emotions. The automatic emotions are connected with the (a) homeostatic and (b) hedonistic regulatory (...) mechanisms. The reflective emotions—uniquely human—are described in reference to deliberative processes and appraisals based on two types of conceptual and verbalized evaluative standards: (a) ideal self-standards and (b) general, axiological standards of good and evil. (shrink)

Introduction to special issue "Ricoeur and the Problem of Space".

The article investigates the evolution of views of a prominent Ukrainian philosopher S. Krymskyi proceeding from logics and methodology of science to philosophy of culture and spirituality.

This edited collection considers how feminist strategies and philosophies might initiate, reshape, and critique approaches to library reference services.

Este texto se propone responder a la pregunta acerca de la relación entre estética y filosofía de la historia a partir del examen de las teorías estéticas de Winckelmann (mediados del s. XVIII) frente a las reflexiones acerca de la historia de Burckhardt (finales del s. XIX), atravesadas ambas por el significado que adquiere en cada una de ellas el concepto de lo clásico. La idea es mostrar cómo una historia del arte como la de Winckelmann, cuyo criterio es el (...) arte griego como canon, trae necesariamente consigo una filosofía de la historia que la sustenta y la hace posible; a la vez que una reflexión sobre la historia como La de Burckhardt, que se presenta a sí misma como una respuesta a la tradición neoclásica y romántica que la precede, refleja tras de sí un pensamiento estético propio. (shrink)

Arturo Roig inscribe el ejercicio del filosofar en la geografía de su función crítica. Crítica que es comprendida como una forma de pensamiento que se cuestiona a sí mismo y que considera no sólo los límites y posibilidades de la razón, sino también la realidad humana e histórica de un sujeto que se constituye en un "nosotros". La filosofía, así entendida, es un saber de vida. La función utópica se presenta como tarea para este saber de conjetura y para una (...) filosofía que sirve a la vida. Roig devuelve con ello el valor epistémico que tiene el plus lo axiológico, no verificable como hipótesis científica. Arturo Roig inscribes the exercise of philosophizing in the geography of its critical function. Critique that is understood as a form of thought that questions itself and considers not only the limits and possibilities of reason, but also the human and historical reality of a subject that becomes a "we". Philosophy, thus understood, is a knowledge of life. The utopian function arises as a task for this knowledge of conjecture that serves to life. Thus Roig gives back an axiological dimension as epistemic value to this knowledge. (shrink)

At the time of its introduction in the end of the 1980s, the concept of natural capital represented new, more ecologically aware thinking in economics. As a symbol of novel thinking, the metaphor of natural capital stimulated a debate between different disciplinary traditions on the definitions of the concept and research priorities and methods. The concept became a means to control the discourse of sustainable development. In this paper, I focus on the power/ knowledge implications of the use of the (...) concept, and I follow the career of the concept of natural capital in ecological economic publications between the years 1988 and 2000. The main interests are in the use of the concept to affect the rules according to which claims concerning sustainable development can be made and in the constitution of objects of environmental knowledge. (shrink)